Multiplying Diversity: Family Unification and the Regional Origins of Late-age Us Immigrants

Int Migr Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2018 October 1.

Published in final edited grade as:

Int Migr Rev. 2017 Autumn; 51(three): 727–756.

Published online 2015 Dec 21. doi:10.1111/imre.12241

PMCID: PMC5613757

NIHMSID: NIHMS729462

Multiplying Diversity: Family Unification and the Regional Origins of Late-Age Us Immigrants

Marta Tienda

Princeton Academy

This bill that we will sign today is not a revolutionary neb. It does non impact the lives of millions. It volition not reshape the structure of our daily lives or add chiefly to our wealth and power…this Neb says simply that from this day forth those wishing to emigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their close human relationship to those already here.

-Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 ¹ (emphasis added)

At the height of the Ceremonious Rights Movement, President Johnson'south vision of the Corking Order resonated with the dismantling of the racist clearing quotas with a system privileging family reunification. Simply history shows that the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (1965 Amendments) had profound, unanticipated consequences. These resulted partly because architects of the legislation vastly underestimated the power of concatenation migration in driving future flows and partly because of policy choices made when high fertility rather than aging dominated population policy agendas. In add-on to making family unification the centerpiece of admissions by broadening the preference categories to include adult relatives of citizens and legal permanent residents (LPRs), the 1965 Amendments added parents of United states citizens to the uncapped category.

A large body of enquiry chronicles how the regional origins of new immigrants shifted since 1970 and afterwards contradistinct the ethno-racial makeup of the United states of america population (Hirschman 2005; Smith and Edmonston 1997; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990), with due attending to the rapid increase in the share of new LPRs from Asia (Reimers 1992; Nowrasteh 2012). Until recently, notwithstanding, there has been scant attention to changes in the historic period composition of immigrant flows (Batalova 2012; Terrazas 2009; Carr and Tienda 2013; O'Neil and Tienda 2015). This is understandable because working-age immigrants dominate new admissions (He 2002; Smith and Edmonston 1997) and because published reports from the Congressional Research Service and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Role of Immigration Statistics provide limited age information about new immigrants.

Changes in the national origin and historic period composition announced to be related, but it has proven hard to demonstrate how much and in what ways because few nationally representative population surveys include information about visa status for the foreign-born. That Europeans constitute the largest group amongst strange-built-in seniors is non surprising because of low rates of replenishment with young workers after the flows receded and earlier arrivals aged in place. But if employment is the primary driver of immigration, information technology is unclear why already in 2000 the Asian share of all foreign born residents was similar to that of strange-born seniors—25 and 22 per centum, respectively (He 2002). Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) argued that family concatenation migration, including sponsorship of parents, is responsible for the rapid growth of migration from Asia, including late-age immigration. To date, only a handful of studies take examined how family unit concatenation migration drives changes in the demographic composition of legal permanent residents (meet GAO 1988; Reimers 1992; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986; 1989; Carr and Tienda 2013; Yu 2008).

Building on claims that the family unification provisions of 1965 Amendments drive changes in both the age composition and the regional origins of United states of america legal permanent residents, nosotros use administrative data to examine empirically whether and how chain migration links these two trends. Specifically, we inquire: (one) How does the prevalence of family unit concatenation migration differ among major sending regions, and (ii) how does the surge in belatedly-age immigration since 1980 vary by source regions and major sending countries? Specifically, we derive age-specific migration multipliers for the major sending regions and the iv top source countries. These nations also characteristic the largest backlogs for numerically capped family unit visas (Wasem 2012), which has implications for the age composition of sponsored relatives who age as they expect for visas in multi-year queues.

In addition to improving on prior estimates of chain migration, our analyses clarify why the age composition of the strange stock population from Asia and Latin America diverged (He 2002; Grieco et al. 2012). Before describing the data and estimation methods nosotros provide a brief overview of the logic that led to Congress'due south gross miscalculation of the impact of the 1965 Amendments on the regional origins of U.s.a. immigrants. The concluding section discusses the implications of family concatenation migration in the context of an aging society and contemplated comprehensive reform.

Policy Background

The Congressional debates leading to 1965 Amendments reveal several issues that preoccupied advocates and detractors of immigration reform in the 1960s. According to Senator Edward Kennedy (1966:145), and so chair of the Subcommittee on Clearing, reform critics worried that the proposed amendments "would profoundly increase annual immigration, would contribute to increased unemployment and relief rolls, would ease the bar to the entry of security risks, and would permit excessive entry of persons from Africa and Asia." Several members of Congress worried that the nation's ethnic mix would change if the bans on immigration from Asia and Africa were rescinded. Also, having nixed the Bracero Plan in 1964, there was piffling appetite for admitting unskilled workers. In allocating a mere 27,000 almanac visas each for professionals of exceptional ability and for skilled occupations facing labor shortages, Congress envisioned German not Chinese engineers and British rather than Indian physicians; however, these employment visas proved pivotal for the surge in Asian immigration (Reimers 1992; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:forty).

Architects of the 1965 Amendments erroneously assumed that the expanded family preference categories would favor migrants of European stock, namely relatives of before immigrants, rather than Asians or Latin Americans. With Asians comprising about ane percent and Hispanics less than five percent of the US population in 1960, neither grouping appeared to represent a huge futurity demand for family visas (Hirschman, 2005:Table ane; Bean and Tienda 1987). Thus, in making family reunification the centerpiece of the 1965 Amendments, Kennedy and his supporters reasoned that the exclusion of Chinese and Japanese laborers during the late 19^th and early on 20^th century coupled with the restrictions on clearing from the Asia-Pacific triangle imposed by the Clearing and Nationality Human action of 1952 implied few Asians to sponsor relatives (Kennedy 1966; 1970). ^two

Table 1

Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) Admitted by Region of Origin, Age at Admission and 5-Twelvemonth Cohort, 1981–2009

(Percentages; Ns in parentheses)

Region of Origin/Age at Access	5-Year LPR Cohort
	1981–1985	1986–1990	1991–1995	1996–2000	2001–2005	2006–2009a
Europe	(321,133)	(385,150)	(670,698)	(518,750)	(679,782)	(449,391)
0–xvi	19.8	17.seven	19.4	20.3	xix.2	14.2
17–49	67.6	70.0	64.6	64.2	67.3	69.two
50+	12.6	12.3	sixteen.0	15.v	xiii.6	16.6
Meso-America b	(881,648)	(2,239,907)	(2,397,916)	(one,499,658)	(one,729,727)	(1,506,105)
0–16	26.four	xvi.two	16.5	25.7	18.six	eighteen.9
17–49	65.iv	74.eight	75.half-dozen	60.9	67.4	64.iv
l+	8.2	9.0	7.9	thirteen.4	14.0	16.seven
South America c	(198,576)	(286,757)	(300,662)	(276,410)	(398,739)	(468,442)
0–16	23.four	19.iv	20.vi	21.1	17.3	15.7
17–49	67.2	68.6	67.3	65.iii	68.2	67.9
l+	9.4	eleven.ix	12.one	thirteen.vi	14.six	xvi.iv
Asia	(one,350,448)	(1,414,772)	(1,661,277)	(i,253,290)	(ane,658,069)	(one,618,588)
0–16	25.1	21.1	19.half-dozen	xix.5	15.7	fifteen.9
17–49	61.0	61.6	62.5	61.seven	67.4	64.3
fifty+	13.nine	17.3	17.8	eighteen.8	xvi.9	xix.7
Africa	(76,989)	(115,261)	(160,012)	(221,103)	(311,362)	(437,013)
0–16	13.9	11.8	16.five	19.ane	16.nine	18.2
17–49	80.five	81.6	75.1	71.eight	73.5	69.eight
fifty+	5.half-dozen	half dozen.half-dozen	8.5	ix.1	9.6	12.0
Worldwide	(two,828,794)	(4,441,847)	(v,190,565)	(three,769,211)	(iv,777,679)	(4,479,539)
0–16	24.5	eighteen.0	xviii.one	22.ii	17.4	17.0
17–49	64.1	70.0	69.5	62.half dozen	67.9	65.8
l+	11.5	12.0	12.iv	15.three	14.8	17.3

Kennedy and his supporters vastly underestimated the force of family unit ties in driving future flows. Not only did annual immigration flows increase, but the influx from Asia surpassed that from Latin America inside a dozen years. A less documented trend is a shift in the age limerick of LPRs toward older ages. Supporting claims by Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986, 1989), we demonstrate that both changes are, to some measure, unanticipated consequences of the family reunification provisions of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Human activity of 1952, including the broadened definition of firsthand family members to include parents.

Regional origins of legal permanent residents (LPRs)

In light of longstanding labor agreements with United mexican states and the explicit exemption of Latin American and Caribbean area nations from the state quotas imposed in 1924 (Tienda 2002), a gradual ascent in legal permanent migration from the southern hemisphere is not surprising. The termination of the Bracero Programme in 1964 without a legal alternative to satisfy the entrenched demand for agricultural workers had the unintended result of spurring unauthorized migration from United mexican states during the 1970s and 1980s (Massey et al. 2002). Moreover, prior to the imposition of country limits on Western hemisphere countries in 1978, Mexico consumed between i-quarter and one-third of all visas allocated to the Americas (U.s.a. DHS, 2011:Tabular array 2). By imposing annual quotas on all nations, the 1978 legislation was particularly consequential for Mexico because information technology further restricted legal pathways to the U.s. labor market (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Massey et al. 2002; Tienda and Sanchez 2013).

Table two

Summary of Family Migration Multipliers by Region of Origin, Age at Admission, and 5-Yr LPR Cohort, 1981–2000

LPR Cohort	Initiating Immigrants (due north)	Cumulative Accompanying and Post-obit Sponsored Relatives (n)	Family Migration Multipliers past Age at Admission
			<17	17–49	50+	All
Europe
1981–1985	128,235	228,878	0.44	1.13	0.22	1.78
1986–1990	178,928	208,684	0.33	0.70	0.fourteen	1.17
1991–1995	308,902	373,634	0.38	0.66	0.17	one.21
1996–2000	215,868	359,383	0.46	0.89	0.32	1.67
Mesoamerica a
1981–1985	221,260	765,742	ane.09	one.98	0.39	3.46
1986–1990	1,497,026	921,425	0.18	0.34	0.10	0.62
1991–1995	1,380,413	1,329,522	0.30	0.52	0.xv	0.96
1996–2000	312,381	one,313,381	1.23	2.22	0.75	4.20
South America b
1981–1985	37,758	195,245	ane.30	three.07	0.81	5.17
1986–1990	101,633	224,133	0.58	1.32	0.31	2.21
1991–1995	88,967	284,426	0.84	i.86	0.49	3.20
1996–2000	61,239	325,445	i.21	3.02	1.09	v.31
Asia
1981–1985	472,080	1,044,320	0.55	ane.16	0.51	2.21
1986–1990	403,160	1,033,399	0.66	1.40	0.51	2.56
1991–1995	526,489	ane,222,461	0.58	i.28	0.46	2.32
1996–2000	301,427	1,192,213	0.87	2.03	1.06	3.95
Africa
1981–1985	29,967	66,377	0.43	one.49	0.32	two.24
1986–1990	57,603	86,784	0.32	0.94	0.24	1.51
1991–1995	lxx,866	117,934	0.41	one.01	0.24	one.66
1996–2000	88,261	201,708	0.59	i.27	0.42	2.29

The surge in Asian migration was unexpected not only because few The states citizens of Asian origin had close relatives living abroad, but also considering the 1965 Amendments capped employment visas at less than 55,000 annually. Because large numbers of LPRs from Asia gained access as employer-sponsored skilled workers during the 1970s and 1980s (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989; 1990), the limited number of employment visas kept Asian clearing in cheque—at least temporarily because Congress increased employment visas to 140,000 in 1990 (Wasem 2012). Refugee flows have proven less predictable in their timing, magnitude, and source countries. Between 1955 and 1974, about fifteen,000 immigrants were admitted from Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam combined; over the next decade, over 760,000 refugees were admitted from these nations (Gordon 1987: Tables 7.1 and 7.two). Upon receipt of LPR condition, refugees are entitled to earn citizenship and subsequently sponsor family members.

Published data from the Statistical Yearbooks of the (now defunct) Clearing and Naturalization Service show that within a dozen years after the enactment of the 1965 Amendments, the number of new LPRs from Asia surpassed those from Latin America (see Figure 1). For the next decade immigration from Asia was consistently higher than that from Latin America. Because the vast majority of the beneficiaries of the legalization programme authorized by the Immigration Reform and Control Human action of 1986 (IRCA) hailed from Latin America, LPR admissions from the region spiked between 1988 and 1992 (Borjas and Tienda 1993). During the early 1990s LPR admissions from Asia and Latin America converged, but owing to a surge in asylum requests from Fundamental Americans and parole condition granted to Cubans over the next dozen years, immigration from Latin America surpassed that from Asia (Tienda and Sanchez 2013). Since 2010 legal immigration from Asia has, once over again, overtaken that from Latin America (Pew Research Centre 2012; Nowrasteh 2012).

Legal Permanent Residents Admitted from Asia and Latin America, 1976–2011

Sources: 1986 and 1999 Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; 2011 Statistical Yearbook of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics.

The auspices of entry are important for understanding future clearing flows because of differences in propensities to naturalize and differences in opportunities to sponsor relatives. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) argued that both employment and "authorities-sponsored" admissions, which include both refugees and legalized immigrants, have the highest family sponsorship rates considering most of their immediate relatives live exterior the United states of america. The influx of over 700,000 refugees from Southeast Asia after the fall of US-backed governments in the region and the legalization of most three million immigrants during the late 1980s dramatically increased the pool of new LPRs eligible to sponsor relatives upon condign naturalized citizens.

Using administrative information for immigrants admitted in 1985 equally spouses of U.s. citizens, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989:872) study that the foreign-born were four times more than probable than native-built-in citizens to sponsor foreign spouses, with immigrants from Mexico, Philippines, Korea, Red china and the Dominican Republic amidst the top five beneficiaries of the immediate family member entitlement. Their analyses too revealed that naturalized citizens from the Philippines, People's republic of china, Korea, India and Mexico featured the highest parent sponsorship rates (Table 8). Although Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) lacked information about relatives subject to numerical limitation (e.g., brothers and sisters and adult children), their findings based on numerically unlimited immediate relatives imply that family chain migration contributed appreciably to the dramatic growth of Asian immigration (p. 884). This is a testable suggestion with of import implications for understanding changes in the age composition of future flows.

Age composition of immigrant flows

Unlike Australia and Canada, the United States does non consider age in determining eligibility for admission (Walsh 2008; O'Neil and Tienda 2015). Although the vast majority of new LPRs are in their prime working-ages, we argue that the expansion of the firsthand family member category to include parents of US citizens appears to have contradistinct the age limerick of new LPRs by increasing late-historic period migration (Terrazas 2009; Batalova 2012; Carr and Tienda 2013). Using administrative information for LPRs admitted since 1980 Carr and Tienda (2013) claim that increases in the number of numerically exempt parents of US citizens were largely responsible for the rise in late-age immigration. They did non examine the regional origins sponsored migrants, thus were unable to empirically validate Jasso and Rosenzweig'south (1989: 884) contention based on a unmarried LPR cohort that parent sponsorship is "an overwhelmingly an Asian phenomenon."

Two principal mechanisms drive the growth of foreign-born seniors: in situ aging of adults who arrived during their prime working years, and sponsorship of developed siblings and elderly parents by naturalized legal permanent residents (Terrazas, 2009). He (2002) shows that between 1960 and 2000, the number of foreign-born residents ages 65 and over was stable at around iii million; betwixt 1990 and 2010, still, the number of foreign-born seniors (aged 65 and over) nigh doubled, ascension from 2.7 meg to almost five million (Batalova 2012). Because Europeans were the major source of United states of america immigrants until the 1960s, they comprised the largest group of strange-born seniors through 2000 (Terrazas 2009); by 2010 Asians and Latin Americans surpassed Europeans among immigrant seniors.

With stock measures information technology is non possible to determine how aging in situ and late-age clearing contribute to changes in the age composition of foreign-born seniors, but almanac trends in exempt relative admissions reveal a sharp increase after 1965. ^three Specifically, between 1967 and 1971, the number of exempt sponsored relatives rose from 47,000 to 81,000, with parents representing eleven percent of uncapped immigrants (The states DOJ 1971:Table 4). In 1981, over 151,000 exempt family relatives were granted LPR status, with parents comprising 22 percent of the total (United states of america DOJ 1981:Table 4A). Although the size of the exempt LPR cohort varied annually during the 2000s—from a low of 331,286 in 2003 to a loftier of 580,348 in 2006—the parent share rose gradually from less than 18 pct in 2001 to 24 per centum in 2010 (The states DHS 2011:Tabular array vi).

Table 4

Summary of Family Migration Multipliers by Age at Admission and 5-Year Initiating Immigrant Cohorts: Summit Four Sending Countries, 1981–2000

Initiating Cohort	Initiating Immigrants (due north)	Cumulative Accompanying and Following Sponsored Relatives (due north)	Family Migration Multipliers by Age at Admission
			<17	17–49	l+	All
China
1981–1985	16,197	124,139	0.89	three.86	ii.91	7.67
1986–1990	xiv,048	118,369	1.05	4.67	2.71	8.43
1991–1995	79,134	173,466	0.37	one.18	0.65	ii.19
1996–2000	32,521	202,944	1.06	3.15	two.03	6.24
India
1981–1985	12,825	127,998	1.78	5.55	ii.65	ix.98
1986–1990	15,370	147,538	1.61	v.59	2.40	ix.sixty
1991–1995	29,086	169,794	i.05	3.xxx	one.49	v.84
1996–2000	36,162	184,830	0.81	2.62	one.69	v.eleven
Philippines
1981–1985	36,569	217,329	one.38	three.11	1.45	5.94
1986–1990	47,110	180,656	0.93	1.92	0.99	3.84
1991–1995	51,059	206,017	ane.00	2.08	0.96	4.04
1996–2000	39,568	200,769	one.08	ii.33	1.66	v.07
Mexico
1981–1985	124,385	233,377	0.60	1.06	0.22	ane.88
1986–1990	1,093,752	316,008	0.07	0.15	0.07	0.29
1991–1995	1,084,947	686,966	0.eighteen	0.34	0.eleven	0.63
1996–2000	102,647	654,398	2.01	3.25	1.12	vi.38

Table 6

Sponsored Family unit Preference (_iiD, ₄F) LPRs past Age At Arrival: Top 4 Sending Countries by v-Yr Accomplice, 1981–2009

(Percentages; Ns in parentheses)

Land of Origin/Age at Admission	5-Year LPR Accomplice
	1981–1985	1986–1990	1991–1995	1996–2000	2001–2005	2006–2009
Red china	(76,439)	(81,311)	(61,370)	(62,150)	(62,378)	(59,250)
0–16	22.iii	19.3	18.4	19.five	17.six	18.9
17–49	66.6	66.0	66.0	61.viii	59.two	58.3
50+	11.0	xiv.vii	fifteen.seven	18.7	23.2	22.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
India	(78,156)	(79,319)	(80,381)	(81,264)	(70,719)	(58,028)
0–xvi	21.3	22.ii	27.0	25.8	20.0	22.1
17–49	74.7	71.seven	63.seven	59.seven	57.4	58.4
50+	4.1	6.i	9.3	xiv.v	22.7	19.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Philippines	(78,969)	(78,745)	(79,360)	(73,371)	(75,007)	(57,639)
0–16	24.nine	25.1	26.0	26.4	27.ii	27.3
17–49	67.8	67.2	62.6	56.0	fifty.2	49.three
fifty+	7.three	7.seven	11.4	17.6	22.6	23.four
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mexico	(92,065)	(83,699)	(186,143)	(369,372)	(289,247)	(188,654)
0–16	36.6	29.ix	41.v	42.4	xxx.iv	29.one
17–49	61.1	67.1	53.4	52.5	63.9	64.9
50+	2.3	3.0	5.1	5.2	5.vii	6.i
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Data and Methods

Establishing links between family unification entitlements and the irresolute regional origins and historic period composition of new LPRs requires information about entry visas and immigrant characteristics over multiple years. The best data source to meet these requirements is the Immigrants Admitted to the U.s.a. micro-information (USDOJ 2007), which we supplement with special tabulations from the Us Department of Homeland Security (USDHS). ⁴ The micro-data file consists of records for all LPR admissions between 1981 and 2000, including persons nowadays in the United states who adapted their status to permanent resident during those years with the exception of the 2.7 million immigrants granted legal permanent resident condition under the provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Command Human action (IRCA). Using custom tabulations requested from the Department of Homeland Security, we augment the Immigrants Admitted data with summary tabulations: (i) for LPR admissions for the catamenia 2001–2009; and (2) for persons granted LPR condition under IRCA for the period 1989–2000.

Both the micro-information and the customized tabulations contain data requirements for deriving historic period-, cohort- and origin-specific estimates of family unification chain migration: yr LPR status was granted; age at admission to LPR status; visa course; and region (country) of origin. The augmented information file consists of a multi-dimensional tabular array that cantankerous-classifies admission cohort (groups of admission years), admission age (grouped), visa class (employment, government, family), and region (or country) of origin. Specifically, the analysis file consists of 51,210 observations with (Age*Cohort*Visa class*Origin) count data over 29 years correspond nearly 25.five one thousand thousand legal permanent residents admitted to the United States between 1981 and 2009. Each observation is a frequency count of LPR admissions for the given set of historic period, cohort, visa form, and regional (country) origin values.

In this classification, admission years are aggregated into 5-twelvemonth cohorts, showtime with 1981–1985; arrival age is aggregated into 3 wide categories: 0–16 (youth), 17–49 (working ages), and 50+ (belatedly-ages); and countries are assigned to five broad regions (Africa; Asia; Europe; Mesoamerica; and South America). ⁵ Visa class, is a key requirement for estimating family unification chain migration. Following Yu (2008), we collapse 352 specific visa classes into x exhaustive categories that represent the major admission classes. Importantly, these major classes differentiate between (one) initiating versus family unification immigrants; (2) accompanying versus later-sponsored family unit immigrants; (three) citizen versus LPR-sponsored family immigrants; and (iv) numerically capped versus uncapped immigrants. The distinction between denizen and foreign-built-in sponsors is important because of the demonstrated family unit links betwixt past and time to come immigration (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989:858; Yu 2008; GAO). Our analyses use the typology developed by Yu (2008) and modified past Carr and Tienda (2013) to differentiate betwixt initiating and family unification migrants.

Family unit migration multipliers

Immigration multipliers represent the "total number of future immigrants generated by immigrants who are non themselves sponsored by relatives" (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989: 861). Unlike immigrant sponsorship rates, which are based on ratios of sponsored and total LPRs admitted in a given year or cohort, multipliers are cumulative measures of immigrants directly or indirectly sponsored by an initiating immigrant, defined as the first in their families to move to the Usa. ⁶ Initiating immigrants must exist sponsored either by nonfamily entities (e.g., employers or the US government in the case of refugees or legalized immigrants) or marry a Us-born denizen. We define four categories of initiating immigrants denoted past the subscript "0", and letters E, Thou, and S designate employer, government and spouse sponsors: ⁷

• ₀E Employer-sponsored initiating employee immigrants (excluding dependents)

• ₀G Government-sponsored initiating immigrants (excluding dependents, excluding IRCA)

• ₀G′ IRCA amnesty immigrants (special authorities sponsored initiating immigrants)

• ₀S Initiating spouse immigrants (sponsored past native-born denizen spouses)

Using these admission criteria, nosotros gauge a series of family migration multipliers, which represent the cumulation of sponsored family members relative to the number of initiating immigrants per admitted accomplice.

But initiating immigrants can start new migration bondage, which are activated either when spouses and children accompany (or follow) initiating immigrants. After naturalization, foreign-born citizens are entitled to sponsor both firsthand family members and relatives such as adult offspring or siblings, thus activating the multiplicative properties of chained migration (Yu 2008). Family unification immigrants are defined every bit LPRs sponsored by family members who themselves are immigrants (both naturalized citizens and legal resident aliens) or who are the accompanying family members of an initiating immigrant. The calculations distinguish among iv types of family immigrants: (one) accompanying family dependents; (2) numerically-limited later on following family dependents; (3) numerically unlimited immediate relatives of The states citizens; and (4) numerically limited preference relatives of US citizens. ⁸ The ancestor subscripts 1 through 4 indicate the sequence in the migration chain.

Accompanying family dependents	aneD Spouses and minor children who accompany initiating immigrants on access to LPR status
Numerically-limited, afterwards post-obit family dependents of initiating immigrants (Sponsored by LPRs under numerically-limited family 2nd family preference categories)	2D Spouses, minor children, single adult offspring) of previously admitted initiating immigrants
Numerically-unlimited immediate relatives of US citizens (Sponsored by citizens under numerically-exempt family unit preference categories)	3Due south Spouses of foreign-born United states of america citizens
	3C Children of U.s. citizens
	3P Parents of U. citizens
Numerically-limited preference relatives of US citizens (Sponsored by citizens under 1st, 3rd and 4th family preferences)	4F Adult sons, daughters, and siblings, with associated dependents, of developed US citizens

The formula for the historic period-, origin-, and cohort-specific family migration multipliers is given by:

FMM jkt = ∑ D 1 jkt + D ii jkt + South 3 jkt ′ + C 3 jkt ′ + P 3 jkt ′ + F 4 jkt ′ ∑ E 0 Jkt + Thousand 0 Jkt + G 0 ′ j ′ kt + S 0 Jkt

where the terms in the numerator correspond counts of specific types of sponsored family migrants, and the denominator terms represent the counts of the four classes of initiating immigrants. The core annotation of each term consists of an upper case alphabetic character and a leading subscript representing an aggregated admission form. Specifically, ₀East, ₀Grand, ₀G′, and ₀S denominator terms correspond employer-sponsored, government-sponsored and spouse initiating immigrants, respectively. The numerator includes initiating immigrants' accompanying and later-following family dependents (_oneD and ₂D); US citizens' numerically exempt spouses, children and parents (₃S, ₃C and ₃P, respectively); and Us citizens' adult offspring, siblings and their corresponding dependents (₄F). Subscript j denotes 1 of the three historic period groups at admission (<17, 17–49 or 50+) among family unit sponsored immigrants; the subscript J, which applies to the initiating immigrant terms in the denominator, is an amass beyond all ages. The subscript yard signifies region of origin (Asia, Africa, Europe, Mesoamerica, or Due south America) or, in more detailed analyses, a superlative sending country of origin (Prc, India, Philippines, or Mexico).

Subscripts t and t′ reflect five-year admission cohorts corresponding, respectively, to the early and later stages of the migration chain. For initiating immigrants and their accompanying and later-post-obit dependents (₁D and ₂D sponsored family members), access cohort t consists of one of the following cohorts: 1981–1985, 1986–1990, 1991–1995, or 1996–2000. The multipliers are truncated in the yr 2000 because, except for accompanying and later-following family dependents (₁D and _twoD), activation of family unification entitlements requires acquisition of citizenship, which requires appropriate temporal lags in club to estimate family unit concatenation migration multipliers.

Sponsorship and naturalization lags

Sponsorship entitlements are constrained both by decisions of LPRs to naturalize and the waiting times to attain citizenship because only citizens tin can sponsor numerically exempt immediate relatives and several family preference migrants (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). Therefore, in order to refine the link betwixt initiating cohorts and sponsorship of family unit members, the migration multiplier calculations adjust the cohorts of citizen-sponsored family immigrants to correspond with one sponsorship generation beyond the initiating immigrant cohort past introducing nine-yr lags. This is analogous to the immigrant generation cohort approach used by others (due east.yard., Park and Myers 2010) to model mobility with cross-exclusive data. The 9-year lag reflects the average eight-year duration in pre-naturalization LPR status plus an boosted twelvemonth for visa processing delays; only it is generous for migrants from Asia but not migrants from Latin America, whose average fourth dimension to naturalization is typically longer (Lee 2010).

Operationally, subscript t′ is practical to numerically-exempt immediate relatives (₃S, ₃C, _iiiP) and citizens' family unit preference relatives (₄F) in society to approximate the timing of naturalization and eligibility for denizen-based sponsorship among initiating immigrants from cohort t such that t′ = t + ix. Figure illustrates the generation-lagged citizen sponsored relatives for initiating cohorts included in our calculations (1981 – 2000). Annual initiating immigrant cohorts (₀East, ₀M, ₀G′, ₀Due south) appear on the vertical centrality; accompanying and later-following LPR dependents (₁D, _twoD) are temporally aligned with these cohorts. X denotes the corresponding annual cohorts of generation-lagged, citizen-sponsored family immigrants (₃C, ₃S, ₃P, _ivF), which appear along the horizontal axis. The _threeSouth, _iiiC, ₃P, and ₄F cohorts are advanced by nine years to reflect this lag, and the 1981–1985 initiating cohort corresponds to 1990–1994 ₃South, ₃C, ₃P, and _fourF family admissions. The grey cells indicate the v-year admission cohorts in multiplier estimates.

Regional Variations in Family unit Unification Migration

Table 1, which reports the changing age composition of new LPR cohorts since 1980, reveals considerable variation in the level of late-age immigration beyond regions and over time. As was true historically, working-age adults accept dominated contemporary United states of america clearing streams: approximately 2-thirds of all LPRs admitted between 1981 and 2009 were in their prime working ages (bottom panel). During this menses not merely did the size of successive cohorts increase—from 2.8 1000000 between 1981 and 1985 to well-nigh 4.5 million between 2006 and 2009—just the share of tardily-age immigrants also rose. The worldwide averages reported in the last row testify that dependent youth outnumbered late-historic period LPRs by more than ii:ane among LPRS admitted during the early on 1980s, but after 2005 the share of youth and seniors was roughly equal.

This pattern is mirrored for all regions with notable variations in both the initial levels and relative growth in late-age immigration over the 29-twelvemonth period. During the early 1980s, for example, late-age immigrants fabricated upwards thirteen–14 percent of new arrivals from Asia and Europe, but owing to larger cohort sizes, the accented number of belatedly-historic period Asian LPRs was four times that from Europe (see numbers in parentheses). By the cease of the period, late-age clearing from Asia approached 20 per centum—the largest share among all regions, which is consistent with the 2000 and 2010 stock measures (He 2002; Grieco et al. 2012). By comparison, about 17 percent of European LPRs from the 2006–2009 cohort were ages fifty and over and the accomplice was approximately 1-quarter as large every bit that from Asia. Between 1981 and 2000, both the absolute cohort size and the share of tardily-age immigrants approximately doubled for new LPRs from Mesoamerica and South America. Only Africa sent below average shares of late-age immigrants throughout the ascertainment period; however, even as the size of African immigrant cohorts mushroomed from 77 meg to 437 million, this region witnessed a doubling in the cohort shares of belatedly-historic period immigration (from 6 to 12 percent).

The migration multipliers reveal how family unification chain migration drives the regional diversification and shifts the historic period limerick of new LPR flows. The first and second columns of Table two report the absolute number of initiating immigrants and the cumulative number of accomplice sponsored family migrants for the major sending regions. The last four columns show the accomplice-age-specific multipliers and the all-ages cohort multiplier (which is the sum of the age-specific multipliers) for the major regions. With two exceptions, discussed beneath, all of the family unification multipliers are in a higher place one, but at that place is considerable variation in levels of family chain migration. Substantively the 1.78 migration multiplier in the top row of Table 2 indicates that every 100 initiating European immigrants admitted between 1981 and 1985 collectively sponsored 178 additional family unit members; of these, 22 were ages 50 and older.

The multipliers, which vary in magnitude across regions and according to the size of initiating cohorts, yield several insights most how family unification chain migration diversified immigration flows in ways the proponents of the 1965 Amendments could not envision. Opposite to reformers' intentions, for example, the lowest multipliers stand for to Europe, and for the 1986–1990 and 1991–1995 LPR cohorts, the multipliers barely exceed one. Unlike immigrants from Asia and Latin America, moreover, the family members sponsored by Europeans during the 1980s and early 1990s primarily involved youth or working-age relatives. Just 12 percentage of sponsored European family members during the 1980s were anile l and over (22/178 = .12; 14/117 = .12). Every bit European source countries included growing numbers from old Soviet Bloc nations during the late 1990s, the share of tardily-age family members rose to 20 percent.

Further defying reformers' intentions, and despite the institution of hemispheric and state caps designed to limit immigration from Asia, family unification multipliers for the region are consistently to a higher place ii. The multipliers imply that during the 1980s and early 1990s Initiating LPRs sponsored between 221 and 256 boosted family unit members per 100 eligible sponsors; of these, between 20 and 25 percent were ages fifty and over. Asian family concatenation migration was especially intense during the latter function of the 1990s, when the ratio of sponsored to initiating Asian LPRs approached 4:1. About a quarter of these sponsored LPRs were ages fifty and over. Although African migration streams are considerably smaller than those from Asia, the initiating cohorts have grown steadily since 1981, as did the number of sponsored family migrants. New LPRs from Africa activated family unification migration bondage by sponsoring betwixt 151 and 229 family unit members per 100 initiating LPRs, with seniors representing between 14 and 18 percent of sponsored relatives.

Cubans and Mexicans dominated US migration streams from Latin America during the 1960s, but economical dislocations and armed conflicts in South America triggered an exodus from Colombia, Peru and Ecuador during the 1980s (Tienda and Sanchez 2013). These flows sparked new family unit migration bondage and fueled big family migration chains during the early 1980s and the late 1990s. The multipliers for these cohorts imply that every 100 initiating immigrants sponsored over 500 family relatives, of which 16 and 21 per centum, respectively, were ages 50 and over.

Family migration multipliers for Mesoamerica showroom the greatest temporal variation because Mexicans and Cardinal Americans were the largest beneficiaries from the IRCA legalization program, which dramatically increased the size of initiating cohorts during the 1990s. New LPRs from this region are also taking advantage of their family unification entitlements by sponsoring relatives. The share of sponsored relatives ages l and over rose from 11 to 18 pct over the ascertainment flow, which parallels the national trend. The family migration multipliers for the 1981–1985 and 1996–2000 initiating cohorts indicate that each 100 LPRs from Mesoamerica sponsored, respectively, around 350 and 420 additional relatives past 2009. That the multipliers corresponding to the 1986–1990 and 1991–1995 Mesoamerican cohorts are below unity is an artifact of the outsized initiating cohorts legalized nether IRCA. Initiating cohorts from the region approached i.5 and one.4 million, respectively, during the legalization menses, which extended through the early 1990s (see Tabular array ane). Another reason for the comparatively depression multipliers for these cohorts is the large representation of Mexicans, who boilerplate longer times to naturalization, and whose waiting times in the queue for country-capped visas are among the longest (Baker 2007; 2010). Nevertheless, the legalization cohorts jointly sponsored over ii million family members by 2009 (.921 thousand and i.3 1000000, respectively, for the 1986–1990 and 1991–1995 initiating cohorts).

To summarize, not only does the magnitude of family chain migration differ over fourth dimension and by region, just partly owing to large fluctuations in the size of initiating cohorts, the absolute numbers also differ appreciably,. This is dramatically evident for migrants from Mexico and the Caribbean in the aftermath of the legalization program. Second, although the bulk of legal permanent residents are in their prime number working ages, late-age immigration rose for all regions, albeit not uniformly (see besides Table i). A comparing of the 2 largest sending regions—Asia and Mesoamerica—underscores this point. Third, the total number of sponsored family members depends both on the size of initiating cohorts and whether relatives are field of study to numerical limitation: spouses, dependent children and immediate family unit members of US citizens are exempted from state caps, only other relatives are non. The family unit unification tardily-age immigration multipliers imply that the 1996–2000 initiating LPR cohort from Asia sponsored roughly 320,000 relatives ages 50 and over [(106/396)*1192213] compared with 235,000 from Mesoamerica [(75/420)*1313381].

Although informative, regional trends conceal a great deal of country-specific variation that can clarify how Asia became the ascendant regional source of new immigrants within a dozen years after the restrictions on entry from the Eastern Hemisphere were lifted (Figure ane), and why the age composition of family unification chain migration differs across regions. Nosotros focus on the iv top sending countries—United mexican states, China, India and the Philippines—because of their potential to intensify late-age immigration due to the growing visa backlogs for non-exempt family relatives (Wasem 2012) and because the absenteeism of a cap for immediate family relatives, including parents of US citizens, potentially tin can accelerate the growth of late-age immigration in the future. This is peculiarly important for People's republic of china, whose population will age gradually until 2015, and quickly thereafter (Peng 2011).

Family Chain Migration: The Top Four Sending Countries

Mexico is currently and has been the largest unmarried source of legal US immigrants since the second half of the 20^thursday century. Between 1961–1970, for example, 454,000 Mexicans received LPR status compared with 428,000 for all of Asia, including 35,000 and 27,000 from Communist china and India, respectively (run across USDOJ 1980 Statistical Yearbook: Table 2). Despite the longstanding function of Mexicans as a source of low-wage labor for the United States, employers sponsor relatively few LPRs from United mexican states; rather, the vast majority of Mexican LPRs are beneficiaries of family reunification entitlements exercised by US citizens. Of the Mexicans granted LPR condition in fiscal year 2010, for example, less than x percent qualified for an employment visa (Tienda and Sanchez 2013). Except for the federal legalization program that enabled over ii million Mexican nationals to accommodate their legal status during the late 1980s and early 1990s, family reunification remains the primary pathway to legal US residence for Mexicans.

Attributable partly to U.s. involvement in the Pacific during the tardily 19^th and early xx^th century, migration from the Philippines has longer antecedents than that from Bharat and China. This is reflected in the consistently larger Philippine cohort sizes through 2000; thereafter, the size of LPR cohorts from India and subsequently Prc surpassed that from the Philippines, as shown in Table 3. After restrictions on Asian immigration were lifted in 1965, India and Red china joined Philippines in sending big numbers of legal immigrants to the United states of america by first availing themselves to the skilled employment preference visas and, after acquiring citizenship, sponsoring relatives (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989).

Table 3

New Legal Permanent Residents past Age at Access: Top Four Sending Countries by five-Year LPR Cohort, 1981–2009

(Percentages; Ns in parentheses)

Origin State/Age at Admission	5-Twelvemonth LPR Accomplice
	1981–1985	1986–1990	1991–1995	1996–2000	2001–2005	2006–2009
Mainland china	(126,689)	(135,923)	(222,430)	(n=177,277)	(250,964)	(289,748)
0–16	15.seven	13.two	12.ane	16.5	12.three	10.5
17–49	55.5	54.2	64.5	threescore.2	65.0	66.8
l+	28.viii	32.6	23.4	23.3	22.vii	22.seven
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
India	(117,608)	(134,510)	(173,176)	(n=189,005)	(343,618)	(246,044)
0–16	17.2	sixteen.ane	17.ii	16.0	xi.8	12.vii
17–49	65.6	62.6	62.6	63.2	73.ane	65.6
50+	17.one	21.3	xx.ane	20.8	15.1	21.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Philippines	(219,319)	(255,750)	(280,475)	(n=211,425)	(266,637)	(260,174)
0–xvi	21.five	21.4	21.9	19.7	xviii.9	19.3
17–49	56.five	57.6	57.7	57.ix	lx.9	56.4
50+	22.0	20.9	xx.4	22.four	21.2	24.three
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mexico	(334,507)	(one,320,175)	(one,488,140)	(due north=757,593)	(875,719)	(575,561)
0–16	26.9	12.8	xi.4	29.0	18.0	xviii.4
17–49	67.6	79.6	82.3	57.3	67.2	63.6
fifty+	5.6	7.6	6.3	13.8	14.eight	18.ane
Full	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table three shows rather distinct country profiles based on the size, growth and age composition of new immigrant streams. Between 1981 and 2009, most 1.two million LPRs were admitted each from Mainland china and India, which compares with i.v million from the Philippines and v.4 million from Mexico. Both India and China witnessed steady, if non monotonic, growth in LPR accomplice size such that the 2006–2009 cohorts were over two times larger than the 1981–1985 cohorts (ratios of 2.1:1 and 2.three:1 for India and Prc, respectively). The LPR cohorts from the Philippines peaked at 280 thousand during the latter half of the 1990s, but generally averaged effectually 250–260 yard per five-year period. ⁹

Because employment visas served as the main gateway to Asian migration since 1981, prime-historic period workers dominated these streams, peculiarly for migrants from India. All the same, the cohort shares of late-age migrants from the top three Asian source countries exceeded the global averages by a considerable margin throughout the ascertainment period (see last row in Table 1). For example, during the 1980s between 29 and 33 percent of LPRs from China were ages 50 and over. Although this share cruel to under a quarter during the 1990s, the absolute accomplice sizes more than than doubled, which corresponds to an 80 percentage increase in the absolute number of Chinese LPRs ages 50 and over (from 36 thousand to 66 g). The size of Indian LPR cohorts more than doubled over iii decades even as the share of late-age migrants rose from 17 to 22 percent. In absolute terms, late historic period-migration from Republic of india rose from nearly 20 k during the early on 1980s to over 53 thou for the most contempo LPR cohort. Unlike Republic of india and Mainland china, the cohort shares of late-age Filipino immigrants held fairly steady between 21–22 percent until after 2005, when most i-in-four new LPRs (over 62 chiliad) were ages l and over.

Mexico differs from the acme Asian source countries in two central respects. First, Mexican LPR cohorts are more twice the size of the iii summit-sending Asian countries (peculiarly the postal service-IRCA cohorts), which is of import because accomplice size influences the future scale of family unification chain migration. Second, the prevalence of Mexican late-age migration is consistently lower than all of the top iii Asian nations over he entire period; nonetheless, Mexico witnessed a trebling in late-historic period migration since 1981, from about 6 percent to xviii percent, which is just above the worldwide average of 17.3 pct (compare final row of Tables i and ​ three). Furthermore, except for the 1981–1985 accomplice, the accented number of late-historic period Mexican immigrants was significantly larger than each of the three top Asian origin nations. For perspective, fewer than 20,000 Mexicans granted LPR status between 1981 and 1985 were ages 50 and over, compared with 36,000 and 48,000, respectively, from Mainland china and the Philippines. Mexico also was the largest single source of late-historic period immigrants during the 2006–2009 flow, when the number of new LPRs ages fifty and over exceeded 100,000. ^ten

Bolstered by the higher worldwide ceilings and the larger number of visas for skilled workers established by the 1990 Immigration Act, country-specific estimates of family unification chain migration reported in Table 4 reveal migration multipliers that are college than the regional averages. Enabled by high family sponsorship rates among naturalized immigrants, each 100 initiating Chinese immigrants sponsored between 767 and 843 family relatives during the 1980s. That the United States offered refuge to thousands of Chinese following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre increased the size of the 1991–1995 initiating cohort more than fivefold compared with the 1986–1990 initiating accomplice. The depression multiplier for the 1991–1995 cohort reflects the refugee-produced bulge, simply as column (2) indicates, the accented number of accompanying and sponsored family migrants cumulated through the 1990s, fifty-fifty afterwards the size of the initiating immigrant cohort was halved.

The family unification migration multipliers for Republic of india are even more hitting, as alphabetize values approached ten during the 1980s, indicating that every 100 initiating Indians admitted during the 1980s sponsored between 960 and 998 boosted relatives by 2009; of these, approximately one-in-four were ages fifty and over. The multiplier alphabetize was nigh halved by the late 1990s; however, considering the size of the initiating cohorts had more than than doubled, the absolute scale of family unification immigration increased as well—from 147 thousand in the late 1980s to about 185 thousand sponsored family members during the late 1990s. Multipliers imply that every 100 Indians granted LPR status betwixt 1996 and 2000 on average sponsored more than 500 additional relatives by 2009.

Mexicans besides take benefited from family reunification chain migration both in accented and relative terms. Although Mexico'south family unification multipliers are smaller than those of the top three Asian source countries through the mid-1990s, subsequently 1996 they surpassed those of Republic of india and the Philippines, and converged with the Chinese multipliers. The smaller multipliers for the interim LPR cohorts from Mexico reverberate the hefty IRCA cohorts in the denominator of the multiplier index; however. the absolute number of sponsored relatives was over double that from Red china and Bharat during the 1980s and over three times larger during the 1990s. As legalized immigrants acquired citizenship, many activated their family unification entitlements by sponsoring relatives exempt from and field of study to the numerical caps. The former include parents and the latter include developed relatives that may have to await years for a visa.

An test of the uncapped visa category provides farther insight into the underlying dynamics, and specifically the unintended consequences of broadening the definition of immediate relatives to include parents in 1965. For each of the top Asian source countries, the number of sponsored parents grew steadily as earlier arrivals naturalized and submitted visa petitions on behalf of their parents. Not surprisingly, over 95 percent of sponsored parents from Asia (compared with about 87 percent of those from Mexico) are ages 50 and over (Table 5). The modest dip in the number of sponsored parents from Asia during the late 1990s likely reflects the impact of the 1996 welfare reforms, which restricted senior immigrants' access to Supplemental Security Income were enacted (O'Neil and Tienda 2015). This change was particularly consequential for the Philippines; nonetheless, subsequently 2005 the number of sponsored parents from the Philippines rebounded to the level of the early on 1980s.

Tabular array v

Sponsored Parent (₃P) LPRs by Historic period at Arrival: Top 4 Sending Countries by five-Year Cohort, 1981–2009

(Percentages; Ns in parentheses)

Land of Origin/Age at Access	five-Year LPR Cohort
	1981–1985	1986–1990	1991–1995	1996–2000	2001–2005	2006–2009
China	(22,229)	(27,742)	(33,695)	(26,619)	(36,949)	(39,062)
0–16	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
17–49	2.9	2.1	ii.7	3.2	1.2	one.viii
50+	97.1	97.ix	97.3	96.8	98.eight	98.2
Full	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
India	(17,127)	(23,988)	(27,627)	(26,907)	(32,201)	(38,071)
0–xvi	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
17–49	4.6	five.4	five.9	v.0	3.7	3.8
50+	95.four	94.vi	94.i	95.0	96.3	96.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Philippines	(39,710)	(41,451)	(38,767)	(29,642)	(31,427)	(twoscore,136)
0–16	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
17–49	4.5	iv.three	v.two	4.8	iii.four	three.seven
l+	95.5	95.7	94.8	95.2	96.6	96.3
Full	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
United mexican states	(ten,023)	(xix,576)	(22,342)	(87,215)	(115,261)	(89,769)
0–16	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
17–49	16.7	12.ix	13.3	10.4	13.5	13.2
fifty+	83.2	87.i	86.7	89.six	86.v	86.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

By contrast, late-age immigration from United mexican states was lower than that from Asia during the early on 1980s in both accented and relative terms (meet shaded cavalcade in Table four and numbers in parentheses in Table 5); yet, the intensification of Mexican family unification chain migration was accompanied by a ascent in both the number and share sponsored family members ages fifty and over. During the 1980s and early on 1990s, naturalized Mexican immigrants sponsored between 10 and 20 k parents. And, as the outsized IRCA cohorts began to qualify for the family reunification entitlements that allow naturalized citizens to sponsor parents outside of the country caps, there was a surge in tardily-age migration from Mexico. Between 2001 and 2009 naturalized Mexican immigrants sponsored over 200 m parents; this is well above the roughly thirty,000 parents sponsored by naturalized counterparts during the 1980s. These results suggest that IRCA indirectly increased late-historic period migration from United mexican states, yet some other unintended consequence of federal policy.

Parents are not the only source of late-age immigration. Because siblings and adult children of US citizens are subject to almanac land caps, the number of family preference LPRs from Asia has remained fairly steady over the last three decades. Nevertheless, due to the long queues for the oversubscribed family visas from Prc, India and the Philippines (Wasem 2012), numerically capped relatives also contribute to late-historic period immigration by "aging in place" as they wait for their visa in a multi-year queue. Table vi reveals that the share of sponsored family members ages 50 and over rose even as the accomplice size remained stable. For case, among numerically limited family relatives admitted from the Philippines during the 1980s, approximately seven.5 pct were ages 50 and over; however, nigh one quarter of capped family relatives admitted subsequently 2005 qualified every bit late-historic period migrants. For the Philippines, the wait for a capped family visa tin can extend over xx years (Wasem 2012). Like trends obtain for capped relatives from China and India as both nations evince a steady increment in the cohort shares ages 50 and over.

Mexico stands as an exception in two respects: offset, the absolute number of sponsored relatives is college than that of the top Asian source countries for every cohort; second, the share of late-age family relatives rose more gradually and never exceeds vi percent of any given cohort. Nonetheless, partly attributable to the outsized initiating cohorts legalized under IRCA, the number of capped sponsored relatives from United mexican states more than than doubled between 1986–1990 and 1991–1995, and well-nigh doubled again during the tardily 1990s (lower console Table 6). Since 2000 the number of sponsored relatives from Mexico has fallen, but information technology is conceivable that higher shares will qualify equally belatedly-age migrants in the future every bit family members approved for admission age in the visa backlog queues. In 2010, for example, single Mexican adult children sponsored by US citizens had waited 18 years to receive their entry visa (Wasem 2012).

Summary and Give-and-take

In making family reunification the centerpiece of the 1965 Amendments to the 1952 Clearing and Nationality Act, Congress did non contemplate radical changes in the volume and composition of immigrants. Proponents of the reforms claimed that tight visa controls for the employment preferences combined with annual hemispheric ceilings and land caps would keep the size of flows in check. There appears to have been footling discussion about the implications of expanding the definition of immediate relatives to include parents of citizens or how immigration might contribute to population aging. At that time the US population was relatively immature owing to the infant blast; also, less than ten percent of LPRs were ages 50 and over (US DOJ 1971:Tabular array 10). Neither did Congress gene in their calculations how naturalized citizens would avail themselves to the family unification entitlements by sponsoring both exempt and numerically capped relatives. In hindsight, it is clear that Congress did not understand the ability of migrants' social networks in activating family chain migration. Not only did this lack of understanding produce the feared changes in the ethnic mix of the nation (Kennedy 1966; 1970), just information technology too altered the age composition of subsequent flows as naturalized migrants sponsored parents (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989) and approved relatives waited in ever longer queues to receive archway visas (Wasem 2012).

In retrospect, detractors' worries about increases in the size and composition of time to come flows were well founded, admitting not for the reasons proffered at the time. Although the number of work-related visas was kept depression, at least until 1990, high naturalization rates increased rapidly the number of Asian immigrants eligible to sponsor family members (Bakery 2007; 2010; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989). And sponsor relatives they did! Our analyses of new LPRs reveal that since 1980, each initiating 5-year cohort from Asia collectively sponsored over one million family members. Furthermore, the estimates of chain migration point an acceleration of family unification chain immigration from Asia, such that each 100 initiating LPRs admitted between 1996–2000 sponsored well-nigh 400 additional relatives compared with 221 for Asian LPRs admitted during the early on 1980s (Table ii).

Boosted reasons that the family unification provisions intensified the diversification of the immigrant streams are the huge refugee flows from Southeast Asia during the 1970s, and from Key America during the 1980s, simply particularly due to the generalized amnesty program that legalized nearly three million LPRs during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These formidable additions to the "planned" LPR world quotas initiated migration chains as large majorities naturalized and activated their family unification entitlements. For example, initiating immigrants admitted from Mexico and Central America during the 1990s sponsored over ane.seven one thousand thousand relatives past 2009. That family unification chain migration from Mesoamerica appears to be accelerating suggests that the myriad condition adjustment programs for Central and South Americans since IRCA will continue to increment family migration streams as new LPRs qualify to sponsor relatives.

This report addresses several limitations of prior work by extending the timeline for estimating the magnitude of family unification chain migration beyond 2000, relaxing assumptions of synthetic methods that assume uniform cohort sizes, and disaggregating multipliers by age. Yu's (2008) estimates based on the Immigrants Admitted micro-data are likely understated because they exclude the outsized IRCA cohorts. The longer ascertainment period also permits an early assessment of how the increase in employment visas later 1990 boosted family unit unification migration. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) argue that employment and government-sponsored immigrants have the highest sponsorship rates both because they are unlikely to take many relatives in the host country and because they naturalize at loftier rates. Although their data only permitted interpretation of multipliers for labor certified initiating immigrants over a unmarried decade, their predictions were spot on for Asia. Post-obit the massive legalization program that unduly benefitted Mesoamericans, parent and sibling sponsorship became a Mexican phenomenon as well. Past increasing the base of initiating immigrants, our analyses suggest that other legalization programs, such every bit the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Cardinal American Relief Act of 1997, will likely foment family unification chain migration from the region (Tienda and Sanchez 2013).

Parents of U.s. citizens, who are non subject to annual state caps or worldwide ceilings, are the major source of late-historic period migration, just the numerically limited admission classes consisting of developed sons, daughters and siblings of US citizens increasingly contribute to tardily-historic period migration attributable to long visa queues for oversubscribed countries. In fact, only a dozen or so years after the 1965 Amendments went into issue, Reimers (1983:24) predicted huge changes in The states immigration, including backlogs for United mexican states, Red china and the Philippines too as a large undocumented labor strength. His predictions were prescient. Our analyses verify his predictions past showing how the parent exemption changed the historic period limerick of LPR flows, and convergence in regional- and country-specific LPR accomplice shares ages 50 and over. The provision in the 1965 Amendments that explicitly exempts parents from the numerically capped visas is the main driver of late-age immigration (Tabular array 5), but the sizeable backlogs for numerically capped family visas from United mexican states and the acme sending Asian countries portend further growth in late-age immigration (Table 6). Proposals to clear the backlogs may reduce the extent of aging in identify for oversubscribed countries, but could likewise potentially increase family unification chain migration if the spouses of sponsored relatives activate new chains.

When Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Human action of 1952 by broadening the family unit sponsorship categories, the infant smash was unwinding. But times have inverse in ways that may warrant a afterthought of family admission categories. Particularly during a period of tight fiscal constraints and population aging, decisions about the number and categories of family visas should be made with a clear grounding in evidence most the social and economic costs of tardily-age migration for the migrants themselves likewise as for the hosting families and communities. Many studies examined the impacts of the 1996 welfare and immigration reforms on strange-born seniors (Fix and Passel 1999; Van Hook and Edible bean 1999; Van Hook 2003). Surprisingly few studies consider whether and how the impacts differ according to age at arrival. Given the ascension in belatedly-age migration and prove that changes in US social welfare policy were particularly deleterious for late age immigrants (O'Neil and Tienda 2015), trends in family unification migration reported hither warrant additional enquiry both to investigate how various policy proposals enable or restrict future family migration and to meliorate understand how late-historic period migrants fare relative to their counterparts who arrive in their prime working ages (Terrazas 2009; Batalova 2012).

​

Cohort Matrix for Initiating Immigrant Cohorts, Generation-Lagged Denizen-Sponsored 5-Year Access Cohorts

Source: Adjusted from Carr and Tienda 2013

Acknowledgments

An before version of this newspaper was presented at the 2013 Annual Meetings of the Population Clan of America. This research was supported by the Princeton Center for the Demography of Aging (NIH Grant P30 AG024361); institutional support was provided by a grant (#P2CHD047879) from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Kid Wellness and Human Development to the Office of Population Research. I am grateful for the excellent guidance from anonymous reviewers; remaining errors are, of course, all mine.

Footnotes

¹Cf. Kennedy, 1966, p.148.

^twoReporting to the House subcommittee on immigration chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy reported that "5,000 immigrants would come in the first year, but we do not expect that in that location would be any great influx after that" (Reimers 1983: xvi).

ⁱⁱⁱThe published statistics do not tabulate class of admission by historic period; therefore, it is not possible to ascertain how much parent admissions contributed to late-age admissions.

⁴The Department of Homeland Security Yearbook of Immigration Statistics does publish the aggregate historic period distribution of male and female LPRs, only non jointly past visa classes and regions of origin. The New Immigrant Survey includes visa condition for persons granted LPR status in 2003, including persons who adjusted their visa status, but these data can simply be used to estimate cross-sectional sponsorship rates, not migration multipliers.

⁵Nosotros utilize the term Mesoamerica, which includes Mexico and Central America, rather than North America because relatively few United states immigrants hail from Canada. This terminology likewise makes clear that Central America is not function of South America. We would prefer to allocate Oceania with Europe, but the aggregated tabulations we obtained precluded reallocation of these LPRs. Because the number of immigrants from Oceana is relatively pocket-size, this allocation decision is inconsequential for our estimates.

^sixOthers utilise the term "principals" or "original migrants" to designate immigrants who initiate a new chain; withal, nosotros adopt the latter term because of its more intuitive meaning in the context of chain migration the potential initiation of a new family chain.

⁷IRCA legalized LPRs are distinguished from other regime sponsored immigrants because they are more often than not reported separately in published reports and were excluded from the Immigrants Admitted microdata files.

⁸Our definition of "family unit immigrants" differs slightly from that used by the Department of Homeland Security. (Monger 2010: two). For consistency with our distinction between initiating immigrants and their family members, we classify the accompanying family members of an employer-sponsored initiating immigrant as family immigrants, whereas United states of america DHS assigns them to employment-based admissions.

⁹The elevation and ebb during the 1990s may reflect timing of visa issuance, peradventure due to backlogs because the average for these ii 5-year cohorts of 245 one thousand is consistent with slow growth trend over the entire observation period.

¹⁰Only betwixt 8 and 6 percent of Mexican LPRs admitted during the tardily 1980s and early 1990s were ages 50 and over, but in accented terms this represents over 100,000 and 94,000 late-historic period migrants, respectively.

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Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5613757/

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